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Abstract
This research aims to analyze the impact of the size of the audit committee and
remuneration committee on company performance using the Kompas 100 Index
for the 2013–2015 period. Company performance is measured using the proxies of
return on assets (ROA) and net profit margin (NPM). The research used leverage and
company size as the control variables and the purposive sampling technique as the
sampling method. In addition, the model used in this research was the panel data
model, with the fixed effect model being used for the ROA proxy and the random
effect model being used for the NPM proxy. The results showed that audit committee
size and remuneration committee size have no significant effect on ROA and NPM.
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1. Introduction
Theweakening of corporate governance is a potential cause of a decrease in the capital
inflows of a country because of increased capital outflows. It also has implications for
the decline in stock prices on the stock exchange of the country through the less-
developed capital market, which potentially lowers the currency exchange rate [7].
As the center of the endurance and the success of the company, the board of com-
missioners plays a very crucial role in performing corporate governance. The board of
commissioners itself has the task to supervise the implementation of a management
mechanism and give direction to the company management [15]. To implement the
tasks so that they impact company performance, the board of commissioners is man-
dated to form an audit committee, nomination committee, remuneration committee,
risk policy committee and corporate governance committee [5].
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The establishment of the audit committee is based on the Capital Market Supervi-
sory Agency and Financial Institution (Badan Pengawas Pasar Modal-Laporan Keuan-
gan) (BAPEPAM-LK) Circular Letter No. SE-03/PM/2000, which recommends an appeal
to public companies to establish an audit committee. This Circular Letter explains that
the audit committee has a task to assist the board of commissioners by providing pro-
fessional and independent opinions to improve the quality of company performance
and to reduce the occurrence of irregularities in the management of the company.
Furthermore, the remuneration committee is to be established based on the Financial
Services Authority (Otoritas Jasa Keuangan) (OJK) Regulation No. 34/POJK.04/2014
regarding the nomination and remuneration committees. The remuneration committee
is responsible for assisting the functions and duties of the board of commissioners
with respect to the remuneration of members of the board of directors and board
of commissioners. The London Stock Exchange (2010 cited in Cintya, 2010), in its A
Guide to Listing on the London Stock Exchange, states that a company needs to appoint
new, independent directors in order to establish the audit committee and remunera-
tion committee as they can give important suggestions, such as ideas for changes to
company structure.
From the background of the problem that was previously presented, the intention
of the author in conducting this research is to analyze how effective the board of
commissioners and audit committee are in carrying out their respective operational
duties. Furthermore, the purpose of this research is to determine the impact of the
audit committee and remuneration committee on company performance.
2. Literature Review
2.1. Corporate governance
The implementation of corporate governance practices in a company is one of the
most important processes for maintaining the long-term business sustainability of the
company, as it is intended to meet the interests of the shareholders and stakeholders.
Considering this issue, a company understands the need to implement good corporate
governance (GCG; Link Net, n.d.). GCG is a set of rules or systems that regulate and
control the company to create added value for the stakeholders that is related to
the rights and obligations of the interested parties. This definition is based on the
outcomes of a meeting of the Forum for Corporate Governance in Indonesia (FCGI).
Through the implementation of the GCG principles compiled by the National Committee
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on Governance Policy (2006), the principles are expected to assist the realization of
fair business competition that is free from monopoly practices and has a high degree
of sensitivity to all business activities.
2.2. Audit committee
The audit committee, which is established by the board of commissioners, is a com-
mittee that works professionally and independently. The audit committee has a duty
to assist and strengthen the functions of the board of commissioners/board of super-
visors in carrying out the oversight function over several corporate activities, including
the financial-reporting process, risk management and the implementation of the audit
and corporate governance [23]. According to the FCGI (cited in Surya and Yustiavandra,
2006) and YPPMI Institute (cited in Surya and Yustiavandra, 2006), the responsibilities
of the audit committee include three areas: financial reporting, corporate governance
and corporate control.
The purpose of establishing an audit committee, according to State-owned Enter-
prise (Badan Usaha Milik Negara; BUMN) Ministerial Decree No. 117 of 2002, is to assist
the commissioners and supervisory boards in ensuring that internal control systems
and the implementation of the duties of the external auditors and internal auditors
have been effective. However, BAPEPAM-LK in its 2003 Circular Letter states that the
purpose of establishing an audit committee is to assist the board of commissioners in
improving the quality of information presented in the financial statements, creating a
highly disciplined climate and controls that can reduce the opportunities for potential
deviations by the management of the company, improving the effectiveness of the
internal and external audit functions and identifying all things that require attention.
2.3. Remuneration committee
The remuneration committee is the one that is formed by, and therefore is liable to, the
board of commissionaires. The remuneration committee is responsible for performing
the functions and duties of the board of commissionaires regarding the remunera-
tion for members of the boards of directors and commissionaires, according to OJK
Regulation No. 34/POJK/04 of 2014. The committee is composed of independent non-
executive directors. This is to ensure effectiveness in performing supervision [3, 17].
The remuneration committee is responsible for designing and implementing the exec-
utive salary packages, bonus schemes and other incentive payments, including stock
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options and long-term incentive plans. If the chief executive officer (CEO) becomes a
member of the remuneration committee, it will affect the committee’s ability to act
as an independent arbitrary [3]. The remuneration committee is expected to mea-
sure, assess, evaluate and create a correlation between the amount of a CEO’s salary
and the company’s performance, so that the proper remuneration rate for the direc-
tions/executives can be determined.
Moreover, Deloitte (2004) adds that another goal of forming a remuneration com-
mittee is to raise the transparency of the remuneration-administrating practices, to
increase responsibilities of the shareholders and to commend the remuneration prac-
tice to the executives for the sake of effectiveness in terms of the shareholders’
final approval. In addition, Eisenhardt (1989) concludes that remuneration is positively
correlated with the wealth of the shareholder. The existence of a remuneration agree-
ment urges the management to focus more on optimizing the shareholders’ wealth.
Therefore, to be able to make the best and the most important decisions for the
company’s sustainability, and to positively affect the company’s performance, a remu-
neration agreement certainly helps the management to govern the company. A remu-
neration agreement can be used to reduce agency costs, which is intended to align
the interests of the executives with those of the shareholders [11, 19]. Core et al.
(2003) conclude that there is a relationship in the remuneration between CEO and
shareholders, which will minimize agency costs and therefore improve the company
performance.
2.4. Company performance
The company’s performance is a measurement of the success of the management in
governing the financial resources of the company, particularly with respect to invest-
ment management in an effort to provide value to the shareholders [10]. Company
performance is also a measurement of the extent to which the company is effective
in governing its owned assets in accordance with profit-making. A better performance
shows that the profit a company makes is growing stably.
Return on assets (ROA) is a measure of the company’s ability to make a profit from
the number of owned assets [14]. If a company has a higher ROA percentage, this
indicates that its operations are more efficient, and if has a lower ROA percentage, its
operations are less efficient. Net profit margin (NPM) is a ratio used to demonstrate a
company’s ability to produce a net profit after taxes [18]. The bigger the NPM, themore
productive a company’s performance is predicted to be, which, in turn, will increase
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the investors’ trust in investing capital. The net income after tax shows the ability of
the manager to set aside a certain margin as a reasonable component to be distributed
to investors due to them being a party who has provided capital for a risk [18].
2.5. Development of hypotheses
The existence of an independent audit committee is a sign of a company’s commitment
to a fair governance practice [33]. Furthermore, Klein (2002) argues that the inclusion
of independentmembers in an audit committee canminimize the chance of a company
producing a fraudulent financial report. In accordance with this statement, McMullen
(1996) concludes that establishing an audit committee lessens the emergence of prob-
lems on a company’s financial report. Ultimately, the audit committee’s role has a
positive effect on the productivity of a company.
The inclusion of independent expert directors in the composition of a company’s
audit committee implies that it has the ability to improve performance significantly [4].
In addition, Bedard et al. (2004) explain that the expertise and experience possessed
by an audit committee directly correlates with the effectiveness of its function. This
is because the main task of the audit committee is to supervise the process for the
presentation of the financial report and to audit the company, so the members of the
committee must be adequately proficient in comprehending the problems to be dis-
cussed and researched. Furthermore, Felo et al. (2003) conclude that there is a positive
relationship between the financial knowledge held by audit committee members and
their working effectiveness. In particular, this applies to their role in ensuring that the
process for the presentation of the financial report is well qualified and adheres to the
applicable rules. The Public Oversight Board (1993) explains that low proficiency and
a lack of relevant experience result in an inability and failure of the audit committee
members to comprehend their roles and responsibilities in a company. The minimum
number of members for an audit committee is three persons, and is limited to the
non-executive directors of a company [3].
Based on the aforementioned conclusions, the hypothesis that will be verified in
this research is:
H1∶ An audit committee and remuneration committee have positive
impacts on company performance.
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3. Methodology
3.1. Populations and samples of the research
The research populations comprise public companies on the Indonesian Stock
Exchange. The samples consist of companies listed on the Kompas 100 Index that
have high liquidity, a high market-capitalization value and company stocks with good
performances. The period used in this research is from 2013 to 2015. The sampling
criteria used are for two successive periods in the same year, and if the criteria were
not fulfilled by a company, then the companywas removed from the research samples.
3.2. Data collection and data-measurement techniques
The data used in the research is unbalanced panel data, and the sampling method
used is purposive sampling, which is defined as a sampling technique that is deter-
mined using certain criteria (Singarimbun and Effendi, 1995). This methodwas selected
because it represents the sample and is based on conformity between the sample
characteristics and the sampling criteria:
1. Audit committee is measured using the number of audit committee members the
company has.
2. Remuneration committee is measured using a dummy variable, which is given a
value of 1 if the company has a remuneration committee and 0 if the company
does not have a remuneration committee.
3. Company performance is measured using the proxies of ROA and NPM.
4. Leverage is a financial ratio that compares the company’s total debts and total
equity.
5. Firm size is determined based on the amount of total assets, which is subjected
to natural logarithms.
3.3. Methods and data analysis
To test the hypothesis in this study, the researchers used the following regression
model:
KIN = α + β1UKA𝑖,𝑡 + β2KR𝑖,𝑡 + β3LEV𝑖,𝑡 + β4FS𝑖,𝑡 + ε𝑖,𝑡,
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where:
KIN = Company performance (NPM and ROA)
UKA = Audit committee measurement
KR = Remuneration committee measurement
LEV = Leverage
FS = Firm Size
α = Constant
β1 – β4 = Regression coefficients
ε = Error
4. Results
4.1. Classic assumption test
4.1.1. Multicollinearity test
In this study, the researchers only used panel data to conduct a multicollinearity test.
Using the Pearson correlation, there is no correlation coefficient value between vari-
ables that exceeds 0.90. From these results for this study, it can be concluded that
multicollinearity is not detected in this sample.
4.2. Results of panel data regression tests
4.2.1. Chow test
The purpose of using this test is to identify whether the most appropriate model for
the panel data regression for the ROA proxy of company performance is the common
effect model or the fixed effect model. The Chow test results for the common effect
model give a chi-square value of 348.3492 and a probability value of 0.00. Since the
probability value is less than 0.05, it can be concluded that H0 is rejected and H1 is
accepted. Therefore, in this study, the common effect model is not a good model to
use on the panel data regression. The Chow test results for the fixed effect model give
a chi-square value of 217.1197 with a probability value of 0.00. Because the value is
less than 0.05, H0 is rejected and H1 is accepted. Therefore, it can be concluded that
the fixed effect model is not a good model to use for the panel data regression model
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for the ROA proxy, but is more appropriate than the common effect model, so the fixed
effect model was chosen.
4.2.2. Hausman test
The Hausman test was used to determine the most appropriate model for the panel
data regression for the NPM proxy of company performance, either the fixed effect
model or random effect model. The results of the Hausman test for the fixed effect
model are a chi-square value of 16.2799 and a probability value of 0.0027. Since the
probability value is smaller than 0.05, it can be concluded that the fixed effect model
is a not a good model for panel data regression. The results of Hausman test for the
random effect model are a chi-square value of 8.6223 and a probability value of 0.0713.
Because the probability value is greater than 0.05, this shows that the random effect
model is a good model for panel data regression.
4.3. Results of the regression test and discussion
The following regression equation identifies the effect of the independent variables,
which are audit committee size and remuneration committee, and the effect of the
control variables, which are leverage and firm size, on the dependent variable of ROA:
ROA = 141.3001 – 0.6458 UKA – 1.1795 KR – 0.4454 LEV – 8.0303 FS.
The researchers interpret the results of the previous regression equation as follows:
1. The equation generated a constant value (β) equal to 141.3001, which means if
the variables UKA, KR, LEV and FS are 0, then the ROA value is 141.3001.
2. The UKA regression coefficient is –0.6458, indicating that for every 1-unit increase
in UKA, assuming that the KR, LEV and FS variables are constant, there will be a
decrease in ROA of 0.6458 units.
3. The KR regression coefficient is –1.1795, indicating that for every 1-unit increase
in KR unit, assuming that the UKA, LEV and FS variables are constant, there will
be a decrease in ROA of 1.1795 units.
4. The LEV regression coefficient is –0.4454, indicating that for each 1-unit increase
in LEV, assuming that the UKA, KR and FS variables are constant, there will be a
decrease in ROA of 0.4454 units.
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5. The FS regression coefficient is –8.0303, indicating that for every 1-unit increase
in FS, assuming that the UKA, KR and LEV variables are constant, there will be a
decrease in ROA of 8.0303 units.
The following regression equation shows the effect of the independent variables,
which are audit committee size and remuneration committee, and the effect of the
control variables, which are leverage and firm size, on the dependent variable for NPM:
NPM = 176.154 + 1.5119 UKA – 5.5302 KR – 1.1617 LEV – 10.044 FS.
Furthermore, the interpretation of the previous NPM regression equation is as fol-
lows:
1. In the equation, the value of constant (β) is 176.154, which means that if the UKA,
KR, LEV and FS variables are 0, then the NPM value is 176.154.
2. The UKA regression coefficient is 1.5119, indicating that for every 1-unit increase
in UKA, assuming that the KR, LEV and FS variables are constant, there will be an
increase in NPM of 1.5119 units.
3. The KR regression coefficient is –5.5302, indicating that for every 1-unit increase
in KR, assuming that the UKA, LEV and FS variables are constant, there will be a
decrease in NPM of 5.5302 units.
4. The LEV regression coefficient is –1.1617, indicating that for each 1-unit increase
in LEV, assuming that the UKA, KR and FS variables are constant, there will be a
decrease in NPM of 1.1617 units.
5. The FS regression coefficient is –10.044, indicating that for every 1-unit increase
in FS, assuming that the UKA, KR and LEV variables are constant, there will be a
decrease in NPM of 10.044 unit.
4.4. Hypothesis test results
The partial test hypotheses compiled for this research are:
H0: The independent variables have no significant effect on com-
pany performance.
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H𝑎: The independent variables have a significant effect on company
performance.
The results of the partial test previously described will determine the influence and
the direction of the influence of the independent variables on the dependent variable.
The results of the t-test for the hypothesis (partial) will then form the basis used to
determine whether or not the hypothesis is accepted. H0 is rejected if the probability
value is less than 0.05, and if the probability value is greater than 0.05, H0 is accepted.
4.4.1. Influence of audit committee size on company performance
The value for the audit committee size coefficient (for company performance proxied
by ROA) is –0.6458, and the probability value of 0.6213 is greater than 0.05. The coef-
ficient value for the audit committee size (for company performance proxied by NPM)
is 1.5112 and the probability value of 0.6852 is greater than 0.05. This indicates that the
audit committee size has no significant effect on the performance of the company,
whether proxied by ROA or NPM. This result is in line with the research conducted by
Rimardhani et al. (2016), Lestari (2015) and Yunizar and Rahardjo (2014).
The results of Rimardhani et al.’s (2016) research illustrate that the number of audit
committees cannot guarantee the effective operation of an audit committee with
respect to the supervision of company performance. Establishing an audit committee
solely on the basis of regulatory compliance indicates that the company only follows
the rules. In practice, the role of the audit committee in carrying out supervisory and
control functions is proven to be less than optimal. In addition, the tasks of main-
taining the quality of the company’s financial statements and assisting the board of
commissioners are not fully achieved through the existence of an audit committee.
This is primarily with respect to the supervision of the process for presenting financial-
reporting information; an audit committee seems to only conduct a review of the
company’s financial and accounting information, but is not directly involved in the
process of solving financial problems that occur in the company.
4.4.2. Influence of remuneration committee on company performance
The value of the remuneration committee coefficient (for company performance prox-
ied by ROA) is –1.1795 and the probability value of 0.3798 is greater than 0.05. The
value of the remuneration committee coefficient (for company performance proxied
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by NPM) is –5.5302 and the probability value of 0.1503 is greater than 0.05. This means
that the remuneration committee has no significant influence on the performance of
the company, whether proxied by ROA or NPM. This result is in line with the research of
Renaldo and Sudana (2015) who state that the remuneration committee has no signifi-
cant influence on the performance of a company. This is because a remuneration com-
mittee only exists in a company as the result of an aim to meet the regulations. Thus,
the performance of the remuneration committee cannot be maximized. In addition,
many companies do not have a remuneration committee, which indicates that there
are still many companies that have not realized the importance of the remuneration
committee.
4.4.3. Effect of leverage control variables and company size on
company performance
The leverage coefficient value (for company performance proxied by ROA) is 0.4454
and the probability value of 0.4589 is greater than 0.05. The leverage coefficient value
(for company performance proxied by NPM) is –1.1617 and the probability value of
0.4983 is greater than 0.05. This indicates that leverage has no significant effect on
company performance, whether proxied by ROA or NPM. This result is similar to that
of the research conducted by Syari (2014) and Sesoningtyas (2012) who both observe
that leverage has no significant effect on company performance. This is because the
addition of working capital to debt capital does not affect the proliferation or decline
in company performance.
The value of the company size coefficient (for company performance proxied by
ROA) is –8.0303 and the probability value of 0.0003 is smaller than 0.005. This indicates
that company size has a significant negative effect on company performance proxied
by ROA. This result is in line with research conducted by Isbanah (2015) who states
that as the size of the company gets larger, beyond a certain point, this will result
in a decline in company performance due to a too-large-sized company not being
supported by good corporate management.
The value of the company size coefficient (for company performance proxied by
NPM) is –10.0348 and probability value of 0.1074 is bigger than 0.005. This indicates
that company size has a significant negative effect on company performance proxied
by NPM. This result is in line with research conducted by Isbanah (2015), Talebria et al.
(2010) and Ratnasari (2016). Isbanah (2015) explains that the size of the company is not
a guarantee of good performance, which is reflected in earnings. This is as expected
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because the company has not been able to maximize its assets to achieve the desired
profit. Therefore, it can be concluded that the size of the company cannot be used as
a parameter to determine the probability of the company generating profit.
4.5. Coefficient of determination
The regression result for ROA has an adjusted R-square value of 0.8401. Therefore,
it can be concluded that 84 percent of the ROA variable can be explained by the
variation of the independent variables studied (audit committee size and remuneration
committee size) and the control variables (leverage and company size). While the
remaining 16 percent is explained by other factors outside the variables used in this
research. Furthermore, the regression result for NPM has an adjusted R-square value of
0.0181. From these values, it can be concluded that 65.5 percent of the NPM variable
can be explained by the variation of the independent variables in the study (audit
committee size and remuneration committee size) and the control variables (leverage
and company size). While the remaining 34.5 percent is explained by other factors
outside the variables used in this research.
5. Conclusions, Implications and Suggestions
The conclusions that can be drawn from this research are that (1) the size of the audit
committee does not significantly affect the performance of the company, whether it
is inspected using ROA or NPM; (2) the remuneration committee has no significant
effect on the performance of the company, whether it is inspected using ROA or NPM;
(3) this helps to maintain the existence of the company on an ongoing basis; and
(4) companies are expected to be able to evaluate the performance of their audit
committees and remuneration committees, and maximize their performance bias.
In addition, the implications of this research are that this will help companies to (1)
maintain the existence of the company on an ongoing basis and (2) be able to evaluate
the performance of audit committees and remuneration committees, and to maximize
their performance.
The researchers also provide suggestions for further research, which are (1) adding
company performance proxies, not only from a financial perspective but also from a
market perspective, to vary the results; (2) adding other independent variables, such
as those relating to the board of directors and board of commissioners, which have a
direct role in the management of the company, so that the results obtained relating
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to the effect on the company’s performance will be more accurate; and (3) expanding
the study period so that the results obtained are more accurate.
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